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Abstract 
The judgment of the Court of Justice in Portgás v Ministério da Agricultura, do Mar, do 
Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Território can be read as adding a new twist to the drawn-
out saga on the direct effect of unimplemented directives in EU law. It essentially concludes 
that a defaulting State can enforce a non-implemented directive against one of its own 
emanations. Thus, it can be construed as endorsing a new type of direct effect that might be 
classified as “intermediate” horizontal direct effect. However, the Court reached that 
conclusion using a rationale based on the duty to ensure the effective implementation of 
directives that binds the Member States and without explicitly recognising the existence of a 
new direct effect dimension. This comment evaluates the potential repercussions of the 
judgment.  
 
INTRODUCTION: DIRECT EFFECT AND THE ROAD TO PORTGÁS 
Few areas of the case law of the Court of Justice have met with such intense criticism as its 
decisions on the scope of the direct effect of directives. As is well known, the principle of 
direct effect, one of the two pillars
2
 of the Union legal order, is not set out in the Treaties but 
has been entirely developed by the case law. Following the seminal decision in Van Gend en 
Loos
3
, it became clear that, subject to certain conditions
4
, Treaty provisions could be invoked 
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by private parties before national courts against the State and public authorities to enforce 
their rights under EU law. While the direct effect of provisions in regulations
5
 proved 
relatively uncontroversial, significant difficulties arose when the issue of direct effect of 
directives was brought to the fore.  
From the terse enunciation of the characteristics of directives in Article 288 TFEU, it seemed 
that these acts were not suitable to produce direct effect. However, promoting the 
effectiveness of directives, and addressing the lingering reluctance of some Member States to 
implement directives on time, was at the core of the line of case law inaugurated in Van 
Duyn
6
, followed in other cases like Ratti
7
 and Becker
8
 and which culminated with the 
decision in Marshall I.
9
 In the first of these cases, the Court recognised that directives that 
were sufficiently clear and precise could be invoked by private parties against the State if the 
deadline for the implementation of the directive had expired and the Member State had not 
implemented it.
10
 This effect is what is commonly known as ascendant (or “upwards”) 
“vertical” direct effect.11  The punitive rationale for endorsing ascendant vertical direct effect 
became clear in later cases. It was based on the estoppel principle and therefore designed to 
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prevent a Member State from relying on its own failure to implement a directive on time to 
deprive individuals from their rights under EU law.
12
 
Having set out the parameters for the recognition of vertical direct effect, the Court drew a 
crucial distinction in Marshall I.
13
 There, the Court ruled that unimplemented directives could 
not be invoked by a private party against another private party, as otherwise the latter would 
be directly subjected to the obligations laid down in the directive, a result that would be 
contrary to the wording of Article 288 TFEU. In other words, directives could not have 
“horizontal” direct effect. While this reasoning seemed consistent with the cases on vertical 
direct effect, it was the next stage of the evolution of the case law that earned the Court 
unrelenting criticism.  
Following the recognition of the distinction between the possibility of ascendant vertical 
direct effect and the impossibility of horizontal direct effect, the Court went on to develop a 
series of alternative mechanisms that undermined that distinction by effectively allowing 
private parties to draw utmost effect from unimplemented or misimplemented directives 
against very broadly construed “emanations of the State” and other private parties.14 These 
techniques have built an unpredictable and increasingly complex body of case law and have 
been extensively analysed elsewhere.
15
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One of these mechanisms is particularly relevant for the issues discussed in this comment. 
After stating that directives could not produce horizontal direct effect, the Court adopted a 
very broad construction of the State in Marshall I itself.  This result gave greater pliancy to 
the principle of ascendant vertical direct effect. Thus, the applicant in that case was ultimately 
able to rely on an unimplemented directive prohibiting discrimination against her employer, 
which was a public hospital. This conclusion was reached even though the State was not 
acting there in the exercise of public authority but as a private employer.
16
 The outcome of 
the case therefore suggested that “upwards” (or ascendant) vertical direct effect could be used 
not only against the State in the traditional narrow sense of an entity exercising sovereign 
power but also against a wide range of bodies that qualified as “emanations of the State.”  
In Foster v. British Gas
17
, the Court explained that the concept of an emanation of the State 
encompassed public or private bodies, “which have been made responsible, pursuant to a 
measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State 
and have, for that purpose, special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between individuals”.18 This test, was generally - but not always19- 
understood to be made up of cumulative limbs and was sometimes directly applied by 
national courts without making a preliminary reference to the Court. In some cases where a 
reference was made, the Court of Justice insisted that the test be applied by the national court, 
normally where this court had not included sufficient information about particular bodies in 
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its order for reference to the Court of Justice.
20
 In turn, the application of the test by national 
courts opened the door to variations in the standards of protection of individual rights across 
the Union and, on occasions, to a very broad construction of the test.
21
 In other cases, 
however, the test was all but in name, applied by the Court of Justice in response to precise 
and well supported questions formulated by national courts about the status of specific 
national entities.
22
 
The estoppel rationale at the basis of the recognition of ascendant vertical direct effect was 
difficult to identify in this line of case law because it seemed contrived to argue, for instance, 
that a public hospital could be made responsible for the failure of the State to implement a 
directive.
23
 As Craig observed, however, the Foster line of case law could be interpreted as 
embodying an “inverse principle of state or vicarious responsibility, whereby a body that 
might be in some way connected with the State is held responsible for the failing of the State 
itself, even though it had no control over the relevant event.”24 
Finally, other cases examined the situation where the State or a public authority tried to rely 
on an unimplemented directive to impose obligations on an individual.
25
 These cases 
suggested instances of vertical direct effect going “downwards” (i.e. the State against an 
individual) rather than “upwards” (i.e.an individual against the State). The Court deployed 
the estoppel argument again, but this time to reject the possibility of descendent (or 
“downwards”) vertical direct effect by stating that, if able to use directives in this fashion, the 
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State would be effectively profiting from its own wrongdoing.
26
 It also alluded to the letter of 
Article 288 TFEU to indicate that directives cannot impose obligations directly on private 
parties
27
, thereby implying that they can only do so through the national legislation that 
implements a directive correctly. Therefore, the Court consistently held in all of these cases 
that directives could not produce descendent vertical direct effect.  
Following these case law developments, the dust settled on the doctrine of vertical direct 
effect and most academic criticism focused on the continuing erosion of the prohibition on 
horizontal direct effect.
28
 However, it seemed clear that issues of direct effect concerning 
non-implemented directives would always fall into one of these two dichotomous categories. 
The decision of the Court of Justice in Portgás v Ministério da Agricultura, do Mar, do 
Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Território,
29
 an inconspicuous case on public procurement, 
has challenged this assumption. At first sight, the case suggested a situation of descendent 
vertical direct effect, where the State was trying to invoke an unimplemented directive 
against a private undertaking, and thus seemed to involve a well-trodden scenario in the case 
law. Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, the case revealed potential new ground, which the 
Court seized to develop a different approach to the enforcement of unimplemented directives 
by the State. 
 
THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
The case concerned a dispute between Portgás, a private undertaking that provided a public 
service in the production and distribution of gas as a sole concession holder, and the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Sea, Environment and Town and Country Planning (henceforth “the 
Ministry”). The national court made a reference to the Court of Justice on the interpretation 
of Council Directive 93/38
30
, which, at the time, coordinated the public procurement 
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procedures of entities in the utilities sector.
31
  In 2001, Portgás concluded a contract with 
another company for the supply of gas meters and was successful in obtaining financial aid 
under the European Regional Development Fund to cover expenditure associated with the 
procurement of these meters. This contract fell within the scope of application of Directive 
93/38.  Crucially, at the material time, the deadline for the implementation of the Directive 
had expired but Portugal had not implemented it. Several years later, and following an audit 
from the Inspectorate General of Finances, the Portuguese authorities ordered the recovery of 
the financial assistance that had been granted to Portgás on the grounds that the contract for 
the procurement of the gas meters was contrary to the EU rules on public procurement set out 
in Directive 93/38. Portgás brought an action before the national court seeking the annulment 
of the decision ordering the recovery of the financial aid.  
The main issue that arose in the national proceedings and that was referred to the Court of 
Justice was unrelated to the substantive application of the principles in the Directive, or, in 
other words, to whether there had been a failure to comply with the EU rules on public 
procurement. Instead, it was preliminary to that assessment and concerned the question of 
whether the Portuguese authorities could actually rely on the provisions of the 
unimplemented directive against Portgás.  
On the one hand - and this was Portgás’ argument - the facts suggested a situation where the 
State was trying to rely on an unimplemented directive to impose an obligation on a private 
party. According to established case law, it was axiomatic that vertical direct effect could 
only work “upwards” but not “downwards” 32 and, hence, it seemed that the Ministry could 
not use the provisions of the directive against Portgás. On the other hand, the Ministry 
sidestepped any reference to direct effect and advanced an argument based on the idea that 
the Directive was not only addressed to Member States but also to the contracting entities 
defined in the Directive.
33
 On the facts, it was undisputed that Portgás was a “contracting 
entity” within the meaning of Article 2(1) (b) of the Directive34: it was a private undertaking 
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which operated on the basis of exclusive rights - it was the exclusive holder of a public 
service concession - and, moreover, provided a public service in connection with the 
production and distribution of gas. It was therefore, uncontestably, the subject of the 
obligations imposed by the Directive. The Ministry’s argument effectively equated the 
position of an entity that is the subject of obligations imposed by a Directive with that of an 
addressee of the Directive.  It concluded that Portgás was thus obliged to comply with the 
obligations imposed by the Directive, even though the Directive had not been implemented at 
the time. These viewpoints give us the first taste of a case that might be either regarded as 
short of revolutionary or otherwise construed as an offshoot of existing legal principles.  
 
THE OPINION OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
COURT 
 
The Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
At the outset, Advocate General Wahl did not shy away from what appeared to be the central 
legal issue in this case. Thus, the opening paragraphs of his Opinion acknowledged the 
difficulties that had surrounded the case law on direct effect of directives and recognised that 
Portgás presented the Court with a new opportunity to rule on this issue. Further, they 
identified why this case involved a different situation from that at stake in previous decisions 
on vertical direct effect.
35
  Here, it was not a private party trying to rely on an unimplemented 
directive against the State or an emanation of the State
36
 or the State trying to impose an 
obligation on an individual on the basis of such a directive,
37
 but the State trying to rely on 
the directive as against a public service provider.  Overall, however, it appeared that the 
potential effect of an unimplemented directive was the key issue, just as it had been in so 
many other cases before.  After recognising that the provisions of the Directive at issue lent 
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themselves to produce direct effect – i.e. they were sufficiently clear, precise, and 
unconditional - the Advocate General divided the issue into two main analytical steps. He 
said it was necessary to consider, first, whether Portgás was an emanation of the State - and 
hence whether the Directive could be invoked against it – and, second, if this was the case, 
whether the State could then rely on an unimplemented directive against an emanation of the 
State.  
 
In relation to the first point, the Advocate General examined the development of the case law 
following the seminal decision in Foster
38
 as to what constituted an emanation of the State.  
Portgás was, as stated above, a private undertaking that provided a public service. However, 
the Advocate General argued that just providing a public service would not be sufficient to 
satisfy the Foster test because this test was comprised of cumulative criteria. Thus, it would 
still be necessary to show that the body was under the control of the State and that it had 
special powers.
39
 The Advocate General therefore went on to consider whether the remaining 
limbs of the Foster test were satisfied.  He intimated that it seemed unlikely that Portgás was 
under the control of the State, but concluded that, given the insufficient information furnished 
by the national court, it would ultimately be for that court to decide whether the Foster test 
was fully satisfied and therefore whether Portgás was really an emanation of the State.
40
 If the 
conclusion was that Portgás was not an emanation of the State, then the outcome of the case 
would be straightforward: the unimplemented Directive could not be enforced against this 
company because this would result in a situation of descendent vertical direct effect.
41
 
 
But what if Portgás was ultimately considered to be an emanation of the State?  Could the 
State then rely on the unimplemented Directive against it? Consistent case law had 
recognised that clear and precise unimplemented directives could be relied upon against 
emanations of the State – but, crucially, thus far this reliance had only been sought by private 
parties.
42
 This second issue allowed the Advocate General to trial a line of reasoning – largely 
followed later by the Court - removed from the usual assumption that this type of situation 
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involves the direct effect of an unimplemented directive. The Advocate General argued here 
that the legal problem at hand was unrelated to the issue of (vertical or horizontal) direct 
effect of directives.
43
 He gave two main reasons for this. First, he explained that the 
traditional case law on direct effect of directives was about the interplay between two actors: 
an individual, who alone can rely on an unimplemented directive, and the State or an 
emanation of the State against whom the directive may be relied upon.
44
 Secondly, he alluded 
to the punitive ground underlying the prohibition on descendent vertical direct effect.
45
 He 
concluded that the estoppel rationale could not be extended where the State is trying to rely 
on a directive against one of its own emanations because, in such a situation, the former could 
not be seen as seeking to take advantage of the State’s own wrongdoing.46  
 
Instead, the Advocate General turned the issue on its head and presented the case as one 
relating to the obligation of Member States and national authorities to fulfil their duty of 
sincere co-operation and thus to ensure the effective implementation of directives.
47
 
According to the existing case law, this duty had been interpreted to apply to the State and to 
decentralised authorities but the Advocate General opined that it should extend further to 
include emanations of the State.
48
 If Portgás was an emanation of the State, then it had an 
obligation to secure the effective implementation of the Directive by complying with the 
obligations set out therein. In relying on the Directive against Portgás, the Portuguese 
authorities would be simply discharging their own duty to police the effective implementation 
of that measure.
49
  
 
The Judgment of the Court 
The judgment of the Court followed the Opinion of its Advocate General fairly closely. The 
main analytical path and the conclusion reached were essentially the same but there were 
variations in the arguments supporting the ratio decidendi. Thus, the Court considered, first, 
whether Portgás could be considered an emanation of the State and hence whether Directive 
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93/38 could be invoked against it.  Like the Advocate General before it, the Court stated that 
the provision of a public service was not, in itself, sufficient to satisfy the Foster test and that 
the other limbs of the test also ought to be proven.
50
 The Court scrutinised more closely than 
the Advocate General whether, on the facts, Portgás was effectively under the control of the 
public authorities and whether it had special powers,
51
 but similarly concluded that the 
national court had not provided sufficient information for the Court to make a final 
determination and thus that it should be for that court to decide whether the Foster test was 
fully discharged. 
Second, the Court went on to consider whether, supposing that Portgás was an emanation of 
the State, the State could rely on the unimplemented Directive against its own emanation.  
The Court, like Advocate General Wahl, sought to distance this issue from the case law on 
direct effect of directives and explained that this scenario arose “in a context different from 
the context of that case law”.52 It then held that Member States had an obligation under 
Article 288 TFEU to ensure the effective implementation of directives and that this obligation 
extended to all public authorities and emanations of the State. As a result, Member States 
should be able to ensure that emanations of the State comply with the obligations imposed on 
them by EU directives.
53
 It followed, therefore, that the State should be able to rely on an 
unimplemented (and sufficiently clear and precise) directive against an entity considered as 
an emanation of the State.  
The judgment moved away from the Opinion in the reasoning used to support this 
conclusion.  Thus, where the Advocate General had simply used the duty of loyal co-
operation as the applicable rationale, the Court provided three justifications to bolster its main 
finding. First, it held that it would be contradictory if the State or emanations of the State -
which are obliged to comply with a directive - were not able to ensure compliance with the 
directive by another emanation of the State when this body is, by implication, also under an 
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obligation to comply with the directive.
54
 Second, and working on the premise that Member 
States should ensure the implementation of EU directives, the Court drew in the estoppel 
rationale and argued that States that have not implemented a directive on time would be able 
to profit from their own wrongdoing if they could not secure the compliance with the 
directive by their own emanations.
55
 Finally, the Court used an argument based on the need to 
ensure the uniform application of directives in the national legal systems, explaining that, 
unless the State could rely on the directive against its own emanations, the enforceability of 
the obligation to comply with the directive that falls on an emanation of the State would 
depend on whether reliance was being sought by a private body (i.e. a private competitor) or 
a public entity.
56
  Overall, the Court concluded that Directive 93/38/EEC could not be relied 
upon by a defaulting State against a private undertaking solely on the basis that this provided 
a public service but that the State could rely on the Directive against such an undertaking if 
this also fulfilled all the other limbs of the Foster test.  
 
COMMENT 
The decision in Portgás merits a careful examination on a number of counts related both to 
the reasoning of the Court and to the implications of the judgment. These will be considered 
in turn and include the emergence of a new type of direct effect geometry, the significance of 
this ruling on the application of the Foster test and the impact of Portgás on the evolution of 
the case law on direct effect of unimplemented directives. These will be considered in turn. 
Direct Effect: The Elephant in the Room? 
As seen above, the approach followed by the Court in the second part of the ruling in Portgás 
appeared to be based on the assumption that this case stood apart from cases on direct effect 
and, therefore, that it should be adjudicated under different conditions. But was this 
dissociation justified? Seen from the perspective of Portgás, this case was about the State 
trying to invoke an unimplemented directive against a private company and hence it evoked a 
straightforward situation of descendent vertical direct effect. The Court accepted that this 
would be the case if Portgás were indeed a private party. However, the Court went on to hold 
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that in the event that Portgás was not a private party and turned out to be an emanation of the 
State, it would then be possible for the State to rely on the unimplemented directive against 
its own emanation. It is suggested that the Court made a crucial analytical leap at this point. It 
failed to acknowledge that this would constitute a new form of direct effect and, 
consequently, that it might create fresh difficulties in the understanding of an already 
complex body of case law.  
It could be argued that the principle of direct effect-in the context of directives- has always 
focused on the reliance, or on the attempts to rely, on unimplemented and misimplemented 
directives by private parties or by the State. Seen from this angle, it is unavoidable to 
conclude that the Portgás scenario examined in the second part of the judgment did concern 
the potential direct effect of a non-implemented directive.  Only if one takes the narrowest 
interpretation of the case law on direct effect of directives, according to which this issue is 
limited squarely to situations of ascendant vertical direct effect,
57
 can it be argued that the 
hypothetical situation considered by the Court fell outside the realm of direct effect.  
However, this seems contrived because the Court has often referred to the principles 
developed in the case law on ascendant vertical direct effect when deciding cases on 
descendent vertical direct effect and horizontal direct effect,
58
 and has ruled on the latter set 
of cases on the basis of the parameters set out by the former.
59
 This implies a natural 
connection between them even if one type of direct effect (ascendant vertical) is permitted 
while the others (descendent vertical and horizontal) are not. It all seems part and parcel of 
the same rationale and of the same body of case law. It is also significant that the reasoning 
used by the Court was partially enmeshed in the analytical framework used in the case law on 
direct effect. Thus, the first part of the judgment in Portgás was devoted to determining 
whether the applicant was really an “emanation of State”, a concept that has arisen and been 
mostly discussed in the case law on vertical direct effect of directives;
60
 furthermore, the 
Court examined whether the provisions in the Directive at issue were sufficiently clear and 
precise.
61
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A different question is whether the conjectural scenario examined in the second part of the 
Portgás decision can be assimilated into one of the existing situations of direct effect or 
whether we have before us a new modality of direct effect. On the one hand, the relationship 
between the State and an emanation of the State could be characterised, in some specific 
situations where the Foster test has been broadly applied, as quasi-vertical and descending. 
This would be the case where, for example, the State is seeking to enforce obligations 
imposed by a directive against a body that has a rather tenuous connection with the State but 
which has been classified as an emanation of the State through a generous application of the 
Foster test.
62
 In this type of case, we could argue that Portgás would allow for a “halfway” 
vertical descendent direct effect scenario that would resemble closely situations where the 
State is seeking to impose obligations on private parties on the basis of unimplemented 
directives.  However, it would be much more difficult to sustain this “verticality” argument in 
the many other cases where the body in question is clearly a subdivision of the State (e.g. a 
local or regional authority). 
On the other hand, perhaps a more convincing approach would reason that the scenario at 
hand was a new form of “intermediate” horizontal direct effect, where the State is enforcing a 
directive horizontally against one of its emanations.  This model would uphold the theoretical 
foundations of the Foster line of case law, which effectively equate an “emanation of the 
State” with the State itself. It would not be a “classical” situation of horizontal direct effect 
because it does not concern an action between two private parties but one that applies instead 
one level up between two State entities. In this sense, therefore, there is an element of 
“horizontality.” Furthermore, the message in Portgás is that the new form of “intermediate” 
horizontal effect is permitted – as opposed to the prohibition on “classical” horizontal direct 
effect. Indeed, neither of the key reasons at the core of this prohibition–i.e. the letter of 
Article 288 TFEU or the argument that private parties cannot be made responsible for the 
failure of the State to implement a directive-
63
 would be applicable since, technically, it is the 
State itself, or an emanation thereof, that is subject to the obligations imposed by the directive 
and made liable, in turn, for the failure to comply. The next step is to ascertain the rationale 
that drives this new form of direct effect. 
A Reasoning Based on the Duty to Implement Directives Effectively 
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At the core of the Court’s reasoning was the notion that the duty to ensure the effective 
implementation of directives imposed on Member States by Article 288 TFEU extended to all 
State authorities
64
 and also to emanations of the State. It then followed that these authorities 
and bodies must comply with the obligations imposed by the directive – even if the directive 
has not been implemented – and, vitally, that the State should be in a position to ensure that 
they fulfil these obligations by being able to enforce the directive against them.  
Ostensibly, this approach conflates the general obligation to transpose the directive with the 
obligations imposed by the directive itself.  However, this is a result that already flowed from 
the Foster line of case law. The State has a duty to implement the directive and, of course, the 
subjects of obligations set out in directives must comply with them, whether they are the 
State, an emanation of the State, or a private party.  If the subject of one of these obligations 
is a private party, then this obligation does not come into effect until the directive has been 
properly implemented in national law and it arises only through the national implementing 
legislation.
65
 However, if the subject is an emanation of the State, it seems, as Craig 
explains,
66
 that the “price to pay” for the special powers that this body has been granted is to 
be directly subject to the obligations in the directive once the deadline for implementation has 
expired and the Member State has not implemented it.  According to the Foster line of case 
law, after that date, private parties can therefore rely on sufficiently clear and precise 
directives against emanations of the State.  
Nonetheless, the main question that follows after Portgás is whether a defaulting State can 
also seek compliance with these obligations against its own emanations. The reasoning used 
by the Court was certainly an ingenious way of dealing with a vexed issue. If the intricacies 
of the case law on vertical and horizontal effect of directives could really be set aside, then 
the outcome drawn by the Court follows logically from the principle that all State authorities 
are under an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of 
directives and hence it could be concluded that it is irrelevant whether enforcement is sought 
by a private party or by the State itself.  However, a number of observations seem pertinent in 
relation to the supporting reasoning used by the Court.  
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First, to suggest that the State should be able to secure the compliance by its own emanation 
with the obligations set out in the directive might seem, at first sight, unnatural here because 
the State itself has not complied with the essential duty to transpose the directive. However, it 
can be assumed that the Court adopted a teleological approach by concluding that in 
enforcing the directive against its own emanation, the State is, at least, “de facto” 
implementing part of the directive within itself and that this pursuit legitimises the action 
brought by the defaulting State.  
Second, the Court’s usage of the estoppel principle in Portgás seems inherently justified in 
cases where a body or authority is uncontestably within the narrow, cumulative terms of the 
Foster test (i.e. a State-owned monopoly) because, otherwise, the State could patently benefit 
from its own wrongdoing if it were unable to enforce the directive against a body or authority 
that has failed to comply with it. However, it could be posited that such an argument might be 
less compelling where a body or authority is not so obviously connected with the State i.e. a 
privatised company that falls within a broad interpretation of the Foster test. 
Finally, the suggestion that a different conclusion would lead to a lack of uniformity in the 
effect of directives because a private party could rely on the unimplemented directive against 
an emanation of the State but the State would not be able to do the same is unconvincing.  
From the moment that the Court created the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct 
effect in Marshall I
67
¸ and regardless of the reasons for this distinction, the potential for a 
divergent application of unimplemented directives had already permeated the Union legal 
order.  For example, while Ms Marshall was able to rely on the directive against her employer 
– which was construed as an emanation of the State – she would not have been able to do the 
same had she been working for a private hospital. The lack of uniformity in the application of 
directives was precisely one of the main consequences that flowed from the case law on 
horizontal direct effect.
68
 
The Implications of the Judgment 
Leaving aside the reasoning used by the Court, it is clear that the ruling in Portgás may have 
far reaching implications on a number of counts related to the enforcement of unimplemented 
directives.  First, the judgment may bring the Foster test sharply into focus and have an 
impact on how it is applied. As explained earlier, this test was construed loosely to 
                                                          
67
 Case 152/84, note 9 above. 
68
 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Vaneetveld (Case C-316/93, note 15 above) at para. 29.  
17 
 
encompass a great variety of bodies and authorities, sometimes with rather tenuous links with 
the State.
69
  Moreover, and despite the emphasis placed by the Court in Portgás on the point 
that the test is made up of cumulative elements, the case law is not entirely consistent on this 
point and some decisions have implicitly suggested an alternative use of the limbs in that 
test.
70
  This creates a degree of uncertainty as to which bodies fall within the Foster test. 
Primarily, the function of this mechanism was to provide a wider umbrella for the use of 
ascendant vertical direct effect and, critically, to enhance the possibilities of private parties 
wishing to rely on unimplemented directives. However, following Portgás, those same bodies 
and authorities may now also find themselves the subject of actions brought by the State 
based on provisions in unimplemented directives. In other words, these bodies are now open 
to challenges from a second front and on the basis of a different rationale.  In Portgás, the 
Court strongly pointed towards a narrow interpretation of the Foster test but, if the test is 
applied expansively in other cases, then the “price to pay”71for the special powers enjoyed by 
these bodies may be high. It will certainly be in their interest that the parameters for the 
interpretation of the Foster test are clarified so that it is easier to ascertain whether or not they 
constitute emanations of the State. Finally, as seen earlier, despite the guidance provided by 
the Court in some specific cases, national courts have frequently applied the Foster test.
72
 
Consequently, diverse national interpretations of the test might entrench further the 
differences in the levels of responsibility of these bodies across the Member States, which 
already exist as a result of the case law concerning actions brought by private parties against 
emanations of the State.  
Second, the approach followed in Portgás, grounded on the duty falling on the State to ensure 
the effective implementation of directives, suggests that the State can rely on an 
unimplemented directive against one of its own emanations. But could this line of reasoning 
be taken further? For example, could the emanations of the State, by the same token, rely on 
                                                          
69
 Thus, the term has been held to encompass privatised industries, healthcare bodies, etc. See further, D. Curtin, 
“The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law Context” 15 
ELRev (1990), 195, 197-204.  
70
 See Case C-297/03 Sozialhilfeverband Rohrbach v Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich and Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund  ECR [2005] I-4305, at [27], where the Court placed the main emphasis on the fact that the 
body or organisation in question should be under the supervision of the State but did not refer to the fact that it 
should also have special powers.  
71
 See Craig, op. cit., note 15 at 357.  
72
 See notes 20-21 above and accompanying text.  
18 
 
unimplemented directives against the State or against another emanation of the State? The 
existing case law suggests that this is only possible where those bodies and authorities are 
“assimilated to individuals”73 in the particular circumstances of the case and hence effectively 
where a classical situation of ascendant vertical direct effect can be recreated. However, a 
ramification of the Portgás decision could be that the duty to secure the effective 
implementation of directives falling on the emanations of the State implies that these entities 
should also be able to enforce unimplemented directives to secure compliance by the State or 
by other emanations of the State with the obligations placed on them by the directive.
74
  In 
other words, it could yield new situations of “halfway” ascendant vertical direct effect (i.e. 
emanation of the State against the State) or more forms of “intermediate” horizontal direct 
effect (emanation of the State against emanation of the State).  
Third, looking at the outcome in Portgás, it is unavoidable to wonder whether this decision is 
yet another attempt to give greater effect to unimplemented directives that comes at the 
expense of legal certainty. The technique of using a novel type of reasoning in cases that 
arguably involve issues of direct effect is not new. For instance, in Mangold
75
, one of the 
most controversial cases concerning the effect of directives, the Court did not allude to the 
existence of a straightforward horizontal situation between two private parties in the national 
proceedings or to the fact that the deadline for implementation of the directive in question 
had not even expired. Either of these circumstances would have prevented the enforceability 
of the directive in the light of the traditional rules of the case law on direct effect of 
directives. However, the Court skirted these issues and developed a new approach based on 
the idea that the directive in question embodied a general principle of law that could be 
invoked by the applicant in the national proceedings against its employer, which was also a 
private party. This effectively resulted in the enforceability of the directive in a horizontal 
situation.
76
  The parallels with the decision in Portgás are evident. There, an approach based 
on the State’s duty to ensure the implementation of directives was used to promote the 
effectiveness of a directive but with no clear recognition that the outcome of the reasoning 
produced a new type of direct effect geometry.  At one level, the conclusion reached in the 
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second part of the judgment in Portgás provides an additional mechanism, this time in the 
hands of the State itself, to enhance the effectiveness of directives after the deadline for 
implementation has expired.  It also buttresses the conclusion, already reached by the case 
law that emanations of the State should comply with the obligations set out in the directive 
even if the State has not implemented the directive on time.
77
  
However, the risk to legal certainty arises because the Court seems to be creating yet another 
qualification to the primary – and never explicitly revoked - assertion that directives can only 
produce ascendant vertical direct effect which joins the host of exceptions that have been 
generated in the cases concerning “classical” horizontal situations.78 There is, of course, a 
well-rehearsed argument that the lack of legal certainty and the complexity generated by 
vicissitudes of the case law involving actions between private parties militates for the 
abolition of the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effect.
79
 The Portgás 
decision could be construed as introducing another layer of enforcement where a form of 
intermediate horizontal direct effect is possible. Ultimately, it would seem that 
unimplemented directives that are sufficiently clear and precise can be enforced in EU law 
not only by private parties against the State or emanations of the State but also, in many 
cases, by private parties against other private parties and, now, by the State itself against its 
own emanations. It is therefore questionable whether the parameters of the case law on direct 
effect of directives can sustain the rising tide of this systematic erosion. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As the title of this comment indicates, there might be two different ways of looking at the 
decision of the Court in Portgás. On the one hand, exacting compliance from emanations of 
the State with the obligations set out in unimplemented directives from the time that the 
deadline for implementation has expired is nothing new. It follows from the decisions of the 
Court in Marshall I and Foster and, more broadly, from the duty of sincere co-operation 
embedded in the Union legal order.  On the other, the scenario reviewed by the Court in the 
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second part of the judgment in Portgás cannot be instantaneously removed from issues of 
direct effect. Seen in this light, the case ignites fresh controversy by diluting further the basic 
principle that unimplemented directives can only produce direct effect as a result of actions 
brought by private parties against the State or emanations of the State and by adding 
uncertainty to an already complex body of case law.  
It would have been helpful if the Court had explicitly recognised that this was indeed a new 
form of permitted direct effect for non-implemented directives and had tried to integrate it 
within the existing body of case law on direct effect rather than separating it from it. 
However, whichever view one takes on Portgás, its consequences are likely to be significant, 
not least the finding that a defaulting State could enforce obligations found in unimplemented 
directives against a range of bodies that fall within a loosely defined category of emanations 
of the State and expose them to a “double whammy” of challenges from the State and from 
private parties.  
 
